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В інших випадках знайти кількість точок еліптичної кривої є дуже складною задачею і потребує дуже багато 
обчислювальних ресурсів. 
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Анотація:В статті обговорюються базові принципи Диференційного криптоаналіза, концепції, 
алгоритми, ідеї і методи, які забезпечують цей тип атаки, а також  математичне обгрунтування. 
Summary: Here are described the basic principles of Differential Cryptanalysis, concepts, algorithms, ideas and 
methods which provide this kind of attack and also its mathematical background. 





This paper will attempt to introduce some concepts of cryptography, and especially some ideas pertaining to 
cryptanalysis, the breaking of encryption. The first method which reduced the complexity of attacking DES below (half 
of) exhaustive search. 
Note: In all the following discussion we ignore the existence of the initial and the final permutations, since they do 
not affect the analysis. 
In this research announcement, we describe a related attack (which we call Differential Cryptanalysis), and show that 
it is applicable to almost any secret key cryptosystem proposed so far in the open literature. In particular, we have 
actually implemented it in the case of DES, and demonstrated that under the same software differential model, we can 
extract the full DES key from a sealed tamperproof DES encryptor by analysing fewer than 200 ciphertexts generated 
from unknown plaintexts. The power of Differential Cryptanalysis is demonstrated by the fact that even if DES is 
replaced by triple DES (whose 168 bits of key were assumed to make it practically invulnerable), essentially the same 




1. All the operations except the S  boxes arc linear. 
2. Mixing the key in all the rounds prohibits the attacker from knowing which entries of the S boxes arc actually 
used, and thus he cannot know their output. 
How can we inhibit the key from hiding the information? 
3. Ideas, methods and principles of Differential Attack. 
The basic idea of differential cryptanalysis: Study the differences between two encryptions of two different plaintexts: 
 and P *P , 
Notation: For any value X  during the encryption of P , and the corresponding value *X  during encryption of *P , 
denote the difference by . *XX ' X
Advantages: It is easy to predict the output difference of linear operations given the input difference: 
1. Unary operations (E, P, IP): 
        '' * XPXPXPXP   
2. Boolean operations (XOR):       ''' ** YXYXYXYX   
3. Mixing the key:       '' * XKXKXKX   
We conclude that the differences are linear in linear operations, and in particular, the result is key independent. 
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Assume we have two inputs - X  and *X  for the same S box, and that we know only their difference 'X . 
Denote .  XSY 
What do we know about 'Y ? 
The simple case: when  for any )()(:0' *XSXSX  X  and 0'Y . 
If  we do not know the output difference. :0'X
Definition: Lets look on the distribution of the pairs  ',' YX  of all the possible inputs X . We call the table 
containing this information difference distribution table of the S box. 
Definition: If the entry of the input difference 'X  and the output difference 'Y  is greater than zero, we say that 'X  
may cause 'Y  by the S box, and denote . '' YX 
Definition: The probability of  is the probability that for a pair with the input difference '' YX  'X , the output 
difference is 'Y  among all the possible pairs. In DES, the probability is the corresponding value in the difference 
distribution table divided by 64. 
Similarly we define '  by the F-function, and define the probability as the product of the probabilities by the 
eight S boxes. 
' YX 
Informal Definition: Associated with any pair of encryptions arc the XOR value of its two plaintexts, the XOR of its 
ciphertexts, the XORs of the inputs of each round in the two executions and the XORs of the outputs of each round in the 
two executions. These XOR values form an n -round characteristic. A characteristic has a probability, which is the 
probability that a random pair with the chosen plaintext XOR has the round and ciphertext XORs specified in the 
characteristic. We denote the plaintext XOR of a characteristic by P  and its ciphertext XOR by . T
Definition: An -round characteristic is a tuple n  Tp   ,,  where  p  and  are -bit numbers and 
 is a list of  elements 
T m
 n  n ,...,, 21  each is a pair of the form  iO,iIi   where  and  are 




1I  the right half of P  
2I  the left half of  1OP 
nI  the right half of  T  
1nI the left half of  nOT 
and for every i  such that 12  ni : 
11
0
  iIiIi   
Definition: Characteristics can be concatenated if swap   21 PT  . The resultant characteristic is  2211 ||, TP   . 
Definition: A right pair with respect to a characteristic   and a key K  is a pair , which satisfy *, PP PP ' , 
and all whose differences in the rounds  are as predicted by the characteristic. n,...,1
Definition: The probability of a characteristic is the probability that a random pair  which satisfy *, PP PP '  is a 
right pair with respect to a random independent key. 
Note: The probability of a characleristic is the product of all the probabilities of the S boxes in the characteristic. 
Note: The probability of characteristics of DES is the probability that any specific pair  is a right 
pair among all random keys. We are more interested in the probability that for a specific (unknown) key, a random pair 
 is a right pair. In practice, the first probability is a good approximation of the second probability. 
)'(, * PPPP 
)'(, * PPPP 
Usually differential cryptanalysis use only the P  and T  of the characteristics, but not the intermediate values. 
Definition: A Differential is a set of all the characteristics with the same P and T . 
The probability of the differential is the sum of the probabilities of the various characteristics. 
In most differential attacks we actually use differentials, rather than characteristics. The probabilities of the 
characteristics serve as lower bounds for the probabilities of the differentials. 
Characteristics, which can be concatenated to themselves arc called iterative characteristics. 
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The simplest differential attacks (later called -attacks) break ciphers with the same number of rounds as the 
characteristic. Using 3-round characteristics we can find key bits of 3-round DES, and using 5-round characteristics we 
can find key bits of 5-round DES. 
R0
The algorithm: 
1. Choose some 12  p  random pairs *, PP  such that m PP ' , and request the corresponding ciphertexts 
C  and *C  under the unknown key K . 
2. Choose only the pairs satisfying TC ' , and discard the others. About )2  pairs remain (from 
the m  pairs): mp  right pairs and m642  wrong pairs. If 642  we can assume that all the remaining 
pairs are right pairs. 
( 64pm
p
3. Each remaining right pair satisfies the difference predictions of the characteristics and its values C  and  
are known. The differences of the inputs and the outputs of the S-boxes of the last round are known from 
*  (and from the characteristic).  
*C
' CCC 
If the input difference is non-zero, not all the inputs arc possible, and only a minority of the inputs satisfy the input 
and output differences; in each pair only about 0-16 possible values for the 6 input bits of the S box are possible. Each 
value suggests one value for the 6 corresponding key bits. 
The right value of the 6 key bits must be suggested by all the right pairs, while other values are suggested arbitrarily by 
only a few of the pairs. By cutting the sets of keys suggested by all the pairs, we receive two possible values for each 6 
key bits; in total we receive  possible values for 48 key bits (if all the eight S boxes are active). 25628 
If a wrong pair still remains, still the keys suggested by the largest number of pairs are likely to include the right key. 
In order to attack the full DES (16-rounds) we need at least  pairs: 622*2
1. Their encryption costs more than exhaustive search. 
2. Include all the 642  plaintext blocks (who needs the key in this case), 
3. The identification of right pairs is not so good, since 64  2p
We observe that characteristics shorter than the cipher can be used. Attacks using characteristics shorter than the 
cipher by r  rounds (in which the characteristic predicts the differences in the first rn   rounds of the cipher) are called 
-attacks. rR
R0 -attacks: In -attacks (which were studied in the previous slides) we know that , and thus it is easy to 
identify the right pairs. Then we use the information on the differences inside the characteristic. Still, we cannot identify 
between two possible values for each S box. 
R0 TC '
R1 -attacks: In these attacks, the characteristic predicts the differences except in the last round, and  is the predicted 
difference before the last round. The input difference of the - function of the last round is known both from the 
characteristic and the ciphertexts   , and it can be used to discard wrong pairs. On the other hand, the 
difference of the output of the F-function can be calculated as 
T
F LTLC '  RTLC )'( . 
Thus, we can use shorter characteristics with higher probabilities, although the identification of the right pairs is 
somewhat worse. 
R2 -attacks: Allow to use a characteristic shorter than the cipher by two rounds. In these attack, the attacker knows 
1. The differences of the input to the last F -function, and the inputs themselves. 
2. The predicted differences of the input to the F -function in the second-last round (from the characteristic). 
3. The differences of the outputs of the last two F -functions can be calculated from T  and 'C . 
Identification and discarding of wrong pairs 
For each  box in the last two rounds (total of 16  boxes) we calculate the predicted input and output differences as 
above. If for some  box, the input difference may not cause the output difference (value 0 in the difference distribution 
table) the pair cannot be a right pair. 
S S
S
R3 -attacks: Allow to use a characteristic shorter than the cipher by three rounds. Example: Breaking DES reduced to 
eight rounds using a 3R-attack; 
Use the 5-round characteristic with probability about : 10486/1
The attacker chooses pairs  satisfying *, PP pP  . With probability 10486/1p  the difference after five rounds 
is . In the sixth round  T












Thus, the output differences of  and  are zero as well. 7,6,5,2 SSSS 8S
The output differences of  and  in the last round can be calculated from '  and these zeroes. 
The inputs to the last round are known, and thus the inputs to the  boxes are known up to XOR with the last subkey 
. 
7,6,5,2 SSSS 8S ,CT
S
8K
We can find several possible values for the key bits entering each of the five  boxes in the last round, total of 30 key 
bits. The right value of these 30 key bits is expected to appear as the most frequent value: it is suggested by all the right 









20    of the pairs. 
The right value will be suggested 100 times more frequently than any other value, and thus is easily identified by 
counting the frequency of the suggested values. 
About 100000 pairs (and even less) suffice for this attack. 
1. Choose 100000 pairs *, PP  satisfying PP  , and request their cipher-texts *,CC  under the unknown key 
K . 
2. Initialize an array of' 302  entries with zeroes. 












and 20 bits of the output difference   ''' LRT CFH   
where 20 bits of  are known to be zero, and the same 20 bits are calculated for ''F H : the output of five S 
boxes. 
4. For each of the five S boxes in the last round for which the inputs *, XX  as well as the output differences 'Y  
are known, calculate all the possible values of their 6 key bits, which satisfy     'Y*XSKXS  K  
and create a list of all the possible 30 bits of the key. For each 30-bit value, increment (by one) the 
corresponding entry in the array. 
5. After all the pairs are processed, the highest entry should correspond to the right value of the 30 key bits. 
6. Complete the remaining 26 key bits (by exhaustive search or by a differential attack), 
A variant of this algorithm requires an array of  bytes. 182
Differential chosen plaintext attacks can be converted to known plaintext attacks with higher complexities: 
1. Assume a chosen plaintext attack requires m  pairs *, PP  with difference PP ' . 
2. Request 2/)22( 32 m  random known plaintexts. 
3. There are 2/)22( 232 m pairs in these plaintexts, which are m642  pairs. 
4. Each value of 'P  appears for about 642  of the pairs, i.e., for about m  pairs. 
5. In particular, there are about m  pairs with the plaintext difference P . (These pairs can be identified 
efficiently using hash tables). 
6. The original chosen plaintext attack is executed on these m  pairs. 
The Attack on the full 16-round DES. 
Motivation: 
1. The 15-round characteristic has probability 
1.552 , and clearly cannot be used to reduce the complexity of 
attack below 
552 . 
2. The 14-round characteristic has probability . 
1.542
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3. In order to attack DES, we must then use characteristics of at most 13 rounds. 
4. However, 3R-attacks arc infeasible, since due to lack of data the right key cannot be identified. 
The Data: 
1. Let  jv  be the set of 122  possible output values of 2,1 SS  and 3S , after the P  permutation, where all the 
other 20 bits are zero (assume 00 v ). 
2. Choose the plaintexts in structures of' 142 , using the two best iterative characteristics: 
a) Choose (random) 0P . 
b) ),0( 1 , where 01  PP  0,1 . 1 P
c)  2 , where 02 ,0 PP  0,2 . 2 P
d) ) . ,0( 2103   PP
e) For  0, . :20,30 412 jiji vPPji  
3. In this structure, for every iP , there is some unknown jP , whose difference (before round 2) is 
1
P . 
Similarly for 2P . 
4. Therefore, for each characteristic, there are 132  pairs in the structure, and in total 142  for both characteristics. 
5. Right pairs: the 13 -round characteristic probability is 2,472 . In a structure there are in average 
2,33
 right pairs. 
2,4714 22*2  
6. One right pair is expected to exist in 2,332  structures in average, i.e., in about 2,332  chosen plaintexts. 
Identification of Wrong Pairs.  0, T , thus the input of the -function in the second-last round differs by F   in the right pairs.   is non-zero 
only in the input to  and S . Thus, the 20-bit output difference of  is zero. 2,1 SS 3 8,7,5,4 SSSS ,6S
The input difference of the last round must be zero in these 20 bits. 
This difference can be easily calculated for any pair, and can be used to discard most of the wrong pairs; A wrong pair 
passes the test with probability  in total there are  pairs in each structure, and thus only about  wrong pairs 
pass the test. 
202 262 62
These remaining pairs can be found efficiently: Hash the  plaintexts by the 20 bits of , and process only those 
hashed to the same entry. It requires only about  steps, instead of . 
142 RC
142 262
In previous differential attacks we counted the frequency of the keys, and thus needed several right pairs. 
We observe that when we count by a large number of bits, it is more efficient to compute a trial encryption to verify key 
directly. 
Instead of counting on the 48 key bits, we complete the 48 bits to 56 bits (with all the possible values of the additional 8 
bits), and compute a trial encryption on each of the 56-bit keys: 
1. Given the 2,472  ciphertexts, there is a right pair with a high probability. 
2. Discard wrong pairs by the algorithm in the previous slides. 
3. For each remaining pair do: 
4. Compute all the possible values of the last 48-bit subkey: a total of 84  values in average for each pair. 
5. Complete the 48 bits to 56 bits by adding all the possible 8-bit values. 
6. Compute a trial encryption on each of the 2488 22*4   keys. 
7. During processing of the first right pair, the key must be found. With a high probability, only the right pair 




Differential Cryptanalysis can break many additional secret key cryptosystems, including IDEA, RC5 and Feal. Some 
ciphers, such as Khufu, Khafre and Blowfish compute their S boxes from the key material. In such ciphers, it may be 
even possible to extract the S boxes themselves, and the keys, using the techniques of Differential Cryptanalysis.  
                                      Правове, нормативне та метрологічне забезпечення системи захисту інформації в Україні 236 
Differential Cryptanalysis can also be applied against stream ciphers, but the implementation might differ by some 
technical details from the implementation described above. 
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ПРО ВІДНОШЕННЯ ЕКВІВАЛЕНТНОСТІ НА 
МНОЖИНІ БУЛЬОВИХ ФУНКЦІЙ 
Сергій Мельник 
Київський військовий інститут управління і зв’язку 
 
Анотація: Розглядається  питання класифікації бульових функцій по відношенню еквівалентності, що 
визначене на множині Fn всіх бульових функцій від n аргументів, а також деякі криптографічні властивості бульових функцій на одному з визначених класів.  
Summary: In this article was examined classification of boolean functions on the attitude ecvivalation, which 
determined on the ensemble Fn of all boolean functions from n arguments, as well as some cryptographs 
particularity of boolean functions on one of determined classes. 
Ключові слова: бульова функція, клас, криптографічні властивості. 
 
Нехай G – деяка група взаємно однозначних перетворень  векторного простору Zn (Z={0,1}). Функції 
 та  називаються еквівалентними відносно групи G, якщо для деякого елемента 
gG  
),...,( 11 nxxf ),...,( 12 nxxf
),...,( 12 nxxf = . )),...,(( 11 nxxgf
Представлене відношення є відношенням еквівалентності ([1,2]), за сяким  множина всіх бульових функцій 
розбивається на класи. У випадку, коли nnSG  , , класи еквівалентності називають типами, а також якщо 




Однотипні функції представляють собою одну логічну форму, записану в різних системах координат, тому 
значна частина властивостей бульових функцій одного типу співпадає. 
З точки зору криптографічних застосувань, важливим є питання про співпадання деяких криптографічних 
властивостей бульових функцій ([3]), що належать одному типу, а саме: нелінійність, кореляційний імунітет та 
виконання строгого потокового критерію (“strict avalanche criterion”). З [3] відомо, що перелічені властивості 







, де wx  - скалярний 
добуток векторів wx, Zn, яке для функцій одного типу відрізняється несуттєво (щодо вказаних властивостей). 
Отже, для бульових функцій одного типу ці криптографічні властивості співпадають. 
Слід відзначити, що в літературі найбільш відомою класифікацією є Гарвардський каталог, що перераховує за 
типами всі бульові функції від 4-х аргументів і містить інформацію про потужність типів та оптимальну лампову 
реалізацію функцій – представників типів. Інший, більш точний каталог, був складений групою японських 
вчених під керівництвом професора Нінномія. Представлений Ніконовим в [2] каталог побудований на 
використанні принципів класифікації бульових функцій за допомогою графів зв’язності вершин, що декілька 
полегшує роботу з ним. Каталог Ніконова також містить інформацію про потужність типів та мінімальну 
структуру реалізації бульових функцій. 
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